

# Resources and Further Reading

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## Chapter 1: Introduction to Utilitarianism

Resources for [Introduction to Utilitarianism](#):

### Introduction

- [Utilitarianism: Crash Course Philosophy #36](#)
- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). [Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction](#). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Krister Bykvist (2010). [Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed](#). London: Continuum.
- Kwame Anthony Appiah. [What is Utilitarianism?](#), Royal Institute of Philosophy *15-Minute Masterclass*.

### The Classics

- Jeremy Bentham (1789). [An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation](#).
- John Stuart Mill (1863). [Utilitarianism](#).
- Henry Sidgwick (1874). [The Methods of Ethics](#).

### Further Reading

- Julia Driver (2014). [The History of Utilitarianism](#). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
  - Bart Schultz (2017). [The Happiness Philosophers: The Lives and Works of the Great Utilitarians](#). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  - James Crimmins (2017). [The Bloomsbury Encyclopedia of Utilitarianism](#). Bloomsbury.
  - Derek Parfit (2017). [On What Matters](#). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  - Yew-Kwang Ng (1990). [Welfarism and Utilitarianism: A Rehabilitation](#). *Utilitas*. 2(2): 171–193.
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## Chapter 2: Elements and Types of Utilitarianism

Resources for [Elements and Types of Utilitarianism](#):

### Consequentialism

- Julia Driver (2011). [Consequentialism, New Problems of Philosophy](#). José Luis Bermúdez (ed.). Abingdon: Routledge.
- Samuel Scheffler (1994). [The Rejection of Consequentialism: A Philosophical Investigation of the Considerations Underlying Rival Moral Conceptions](#). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2015). [Consequentialism](#). *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

### Welfarism & Theories of Well-Being

- Roger Crisp (2017). [Well-Being](#). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Nils Holtug (2003). [Welfarism – The Very Idea](#). *Utilitas*. 15(2): 151–174.
- Shelly Kagan (1992). [The Limits of Well-being](#). *Social Philosophy & Policy*. 9(2): 169–189.

### Impartiality

- Robert Goodin (1988). [What is so special about our fellow countrymen?](#) *Ethics*, 98 (4): 663–686.
- Troy Jollimore (2018). [Impartiality](#). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

### Aggregationism

- John Broome (1991). [Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty, and Time](#). London: Wiley-Blackwell. Chapters 4 and 10.

- Krister Bykvist (2010). [\*Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed\*](#). London: Continuum. Chapter 5: Utilitarian Aggregation.
- Alastair Norcross (1997). [\*Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives\*](#). *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. 26(2): 135–167.

## Hedonism

- Roger Crisp (2006). [\*Hedonism Reconsidered\*](#). *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 73(3): 619–645.
- Fred Feldman (2004). [\*Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism\*](#). Oxford University Press.
- Shelly Kagan (1992). [\*The Limits of Well-being\*](#). *Social Philosophy & Policy*. 9(2): 169–189.
- Ole Martin Moen (2016). [\*An Argument for Hedonism\*](#). *The Journal of Value Inquiry*. 50: 267–281.
- Andrew Moore (2019). [\*Hedonism\*](#), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

## Population Ethics

- Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). [\*The Repugnant Conclusion\*](#). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). [\*Future generations: A challenge for moral theory\*](#). PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
- Hilary Greaves (2017). [\*Population Axiology\*](#). *Philosophy Compass*. 12(11).
- Johan E. Gustafsson (2022). [\*Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion\*](#). In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics*. Oxford University Press.
- Michael Huemer (2008). [\*In Defence of Repugnance\*](#). *Mind*. 117(468): 899–933.
- Derek Parfit (1984). [\*Reasons and Persons\*](#). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

## Maximizing, Satisficing and Scalar Utilitarianism

- Ben Bradley (2006). [\*Against Satisficing Consequentialism\*](#). *Utilitas*. 18(2): 97–108.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2020). [\*Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good\*](#). In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press. pp. 498–512.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2019). [\*Willpower Satisficing\*](#). *Noûs* 53(2): 251–265.

- Alastair Norcross (2020). [\*Morality by Degrees: Reasons Without Demands\*](#). Oxford University Press.
- Alastair Norcross (2006). [The Scalar Approach to Utilitarianism](#). In Henry West (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism*. Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 217–32.
- Neil Sinhababu (2018). [Scalar consequentialism the right way](#). *Philosophical Studies*. 175: 3131–3144.

## Expectational Utilitarianism Versus Objective Utilitarianism

- Roger Crisp (1997). [Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism](#). Routledge, pp. 99–101.
- Peter A. Graham (2021). [Subjective Versus Objective Moral Wrongness](#). Cambridge University Press.
- Frank Jackson (1991). [Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection](#). *Ethics*, 101(3): 461–482.

## Multi-level Utilitarianism Versus Single-level Utilitarianism

- Roger Crisp (1997). [Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism](#). Routledge, pp. 105–112.
- Richard M. Hare (1981). [Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point](#). Oxford University Press.
- Peter Railton (1984). [Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality](#). *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. 13(2): 134–171.

## Global Utilitarianism and Hybrid Utilitarianism

- Brian McElwee (2020). [The Ambitions of Consequentialism](#). *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy*. 17(2).
- Richard Y. Chappell (2012). [Fittingness: The Sole Normative Primitive](#). *Philosophical Quarterly*. 62(249): 684–704.
- Richard Y. Chappell. [Consequentialism: Core and Expansion](#), forthcoming in D. Copp, C. Rosati, and T. Rulli (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics*. Oxford University Press.
- Toby Ord (2009). [Beyond Action: Applying Consequentialism to Decision Making and Motivation](#). DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford.
- Philip Pettit & Michael Smith (2000). [Global Consequentialism](#). In Hooker, B., Mason, E. & Miller, D. (eds.). *Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader*. Edinburgh University Press.

## Chapter 3: Arguments for Utilitarianism

Resources for [Arguments for Utilitarianism](#):

- John Broome (1987). [Utilitarianism and Expected Utility](#), *The Journal of Philosophy* 84 (8): 405–422.
  - John Broome (1991). *Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time*. Blackwell.
  - Krister Bykvist (2010). [Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed](#). Continuum.
  - Robert Goodin (1995). [Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy](#). Cambridge University Press.
  - Johan Gustafsson (2021). [Utilitarianism without Moral Aggregation](#). *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 51 (4): 256–269.
  - Caspar Hare (2016). [Should We Wish Well to All?](#), *Philosophical Review* 125(4): 451–472.
  - John C. Harsanyi (1955). [Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility](#), *The Journal of Political Economy* 63 (4): 309–321.
  - John C. Harsanyi (1977). *Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social Situations*. Cambridge University Press.
  - Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). Chapter 2: Justifications, in [Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction](#). Oxford University Press.
  - J.J.C. Smart (1973). An outline of a system of utilitarian ethics, in J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, [Utilitarianism: For and Against](#). Cambridge University Press.
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## Chapter 4: Theories of Well-Being

Resources for [Theories of Well-Being](#):

### Introduction

- Roger Crisp (2017). [Well-Being](#). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Shelly Kagan (1992). [The Limits of Well-being](#). *Social Philosophy & Policy*. 9(2): 169–189.
- Eden Lin (2022). [Well-being, part 1: The concept of well-being](#). *Philosophy Compass*. 17(2).
- Eden Lin (2022). [Well-being, part 2: Theories of well-being](#). *Philosophy Compass*. 17(2).
- Derek Parfit (1984). Appendix I: What Makes Someone's Life Go Best, [Reasons and Persons](#). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

### Welfarism

- Nils Holtug (2003). [Welfarism – The Very Idea](#). *Utilitas*. 15(2): 151–174.
- Andrew Moore & Roger Crisp (1996). [Welfarism in moral theory](#). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. 74(4): 598–613.

## Hedonism

- Andrew Moore (2019). [Hedonism](#). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Ole Martin Moen (2016). [An Argument for Hedonism](#). *The Journal of Value Inquiry*. 50: 267–281 (2016).
- Ivar Labukt (2012). [Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure](#). *Utilitas*. 24(2): 172–199.
- Roger Crisp (2006). [Hedonism Reconsidered](#). *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*. 73(3): 619–645.
- Fred Feldman (2004). [Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism](#). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

## Desire Theories

- Chris Heathwood (2015). [Desire-fulfillment theory](#), in Guy Fletcher (ed.) *The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being*. London: Routledge.
- Peter Singer (2011). Chapter 1: About Ethics, in *Practical Ethics* (3rd edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chris Heathwood (2006). [Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism](#). *Philosophical Studies*. 128: 539–563.
- Mark Murphy (2002). [The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory](#). *Noûs*. 33(2): 247–272.
- Wlodek Rabinowicz & Jan Österberg (1996). [Value Based on Preferences: On Two Interpretations of Preference Utilitarianism](#). *Economics and Philosophy*. 12(1): 1–27.

## Objective List Theories

- Guy Fletcher (2013). [A Fresh Start for an Objective List Theory of Well-Being](#). *Utilitas*. 25(2): 206–220.
- James Griffin (1986). [Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance](#). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Eden Lin (2014). [Pluralism about Well-Being](#). *Philosophical Perspectives*. 28(1): 127–154.

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## Chapter 5: Population Ethics

Resources for [Population Ethics](#):

## General Discussions of Population Ethics

- Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). [Future Generations: A Challenge for Moral Theory](#). PhD Dissertation, Uppsala University.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2021). Section 7: Population Ethics, [Parfit's Ethics](#). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hilary Greaves (2017). [Population Axiology](#). *Philosophy Compass*. 12(11).
- Derek Parfit (1984). Part Four: Future Generations, [Reasons and Persons](#). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

## The Total View and Repugnant Conclusion

- Gustaf Arrhenius, Jesper Ryberg, & Torbjörn Tännsjö (2017). [The Repugnant Conclusion](#). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Gustaf Arrhenius (2003). The Very Repugnant Conclusion. In Krister Segerberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), *Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist*. Uppsala, pp. 29–44.
- Johan E. Gustafsson (2022). [Our Intuitive Grasp of the Repugnant Conclusion](#). In Gustaf Arrhenius, Krister Bykvist, Tim Campbell, and Elizabeth Finneron-Burns (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Population Ethics*. Oxford University Press.
- Spears, D. & Budolfson, M. (2021). [Repugnant conclusions](#). *Social Choice and Welfare*. 28.
- Michael Huemer (2008). [In Defence of Repugnance](#). *Mind*. 117(468): 899–933.
- Torbjörn Tännsjö (2002). [Why We Ought to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion](#). *Utilitas*. 14(3): 339–359.
- Stéphane Zuber et al. (2021). [What Should We Agree on about the Repugnant Conclusion?](#) *Utilitas*. 33(4): 379–383.

## Variable Value Theories

- Theodore Sider (1991). [Might Theory X be a theory of diminishing marginal value?](#) *Analysis*. 51(4): 265–271.
- Thomas Hurka (1983). [Value and Population Size](#). *Ethics*, 93(3): 496–507.

## Critical Level and Critical Range Theories

- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, & David J. Donaldson (1995). [Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles](#). *Econometrica*, 63(6): 1303–1320.

- Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert, & David J. Donaldson (2005). [\*Population Issues in Social Choice Theory, Welfare Economics, and Ethics\*](#). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- John Broome (2004). [\*Weighing Lives\*](#). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Johan Gustafsson (2020). [Population axiology and the possibility of a fourth category of absolute value](#). *Economics & Philosophy*, 36: 81–110.

## Neutrality Intuition

- Jeff McMahan (2013). [Causing People to Exist and Saving People's Lives](#). *Journal of Ethics*. 17: 5–35.
- Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). [Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality](#). *Philosophical Issues*. 19(1): 389–411.
- Kryster Bykvist (2007). [The Benefits of Coming into Existence](#). *Philosophical Studies*. 135(3), 335–362.
- John Broome (2005). [Should We Value Population?](#). *The Journal of Political Philosophy*. 13(4): 399–413.
- Elizabeth Harman (2004). [Can We Harm and Benefit in Creating?](#). *Philosophical Perspectives*. 18: 89–113.

## Person-Affecting Views and the Asymmetry

- Gustaf Arrhenius (2009). [Can the Person Affecting Restriction Solve the Problems in Population Ethics?](#), in Roberts, M.A., Wasserman, D.T. (eds.) *Harming Future Persons*. International Library of Ethics, Law, and the New Medicine. 35. Springer, Dordrecht.
- Daniel Cohen (2019). [An Actualist Explanation of the Procreation Asymmetry](#). *Utilitas*. 32(1): 70–89.
- Johann Frick (2014). [‘Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People’: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics](#). Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University.
- Johann Frick (2020). [Conditional Reasons and the Procreation Asymmetry](#). *Philosophical Perspectives*. 34(1): 53–87
- Caspar Hare (2007). [Voices from Another World: Must We Respect the Interests of People Who Do Not, and Will Never, Exist?](#). *Ethics*, 117(3): 498–523.
- Jan Narveson (1973). [Moral Problems of Population](#). *The Monist*. 57(1): 62–86.
- Josh Parsons (2002). [Axiological Actualism](#). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. 80(2): 137–147.
- Melinda A. Roberts (2002). [A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person-Based Consequentialism and the Equality Problem](#). *Ethics*, 112(2): 315–350.



## Practical Implications of Population Ethics

- Toby Ord (2020). [\*The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity\*](#). Bloomsbury Publishing.
- David Althaus & Lukas Gloor (2018). [\*Reducing Risks of Astronomical Suffering: a Neglected Priority\*](#). *Center on Long-Term Risk*.
- Nick Beckstead (2013). [\*On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future\*](#). PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.
- William MacAskill (2022). [\*What We Owe the Future\*](#). Basic Books.

## Impossibility Theorems in Population Ethics

- Gustaf Arrhenius (2000). [\*An Impossibility Theorem for Welfarist Axiologies\*](#). *Economics and Philosophy*. 16(2): 247–266.
  - Philip Kitcher (2000). [\*Parfit's Puzzle\*](#). *Noûs*. 34(4): 550–577.
  - Erik Carlson (1998). [\*Mere addition and two trilemmas of population ethics\*](#). *Economics and Philosophy*. 14(2): 283–306.
  - Yew-Kwang Ng (1989). [\*What should we do about future generations? Impossibility of Parfit's Theory X\*](#). *Economics and Philosophy*. 5(2): 235–253.
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## Chapter 6: Utilitarianism and Practical Ethics

Resources for [Utilitarianism and Practical Ethics](#):

### Is There a Difference Between Doing and Allowing Harm?

- Fiona Woollard & Frances Howard-Snyder (2016). [\*Doing vs. Allowing Harm\*](#). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Jonathan Bennett (1995). *The Act Itself*. Oxford University Press.

### The Expanding Moral Circle

- Peter Singer (1997). [\*The Drowning Child and the Expanding Circle\*](#). *New Internationalist*.
- Peter Singer (2011). [\*The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress\*](#). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

### Cosmopolitanism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Geography

- [Poverty & Our Response to It: Crash Course Philosophy #44](#)

- Peter Singer (2019). [\*The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty\*](#), 2nd ed. The Life You Can Save, Bainbridge Island, WA and Sydney, available free at <www.thelifeyoucansave.org>.
- Peter Singer (1972). [Famine, Affluence, and Morality](#). *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. 1(2): 229–243.
- Samuel Scheffler (1999). [Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism](#). *Utilitas*. 11(3): 255–276.

## Anti-Speciesism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Species

- [Non-Human Animals: Crash Course Philosophy #42](#)
- Peter Singer (2023) *Animal Liberation Now: The Definitive Classic Renewed*, New York: HarperCollins.
- Jeff McMahan (2002). Animals. In R. G. Frey and Christopher Wellman (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Applied Ethics*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 525–536.
- Jeff Sebo (2019). [A Utilitarian Case for Animal Rights](#). *Effective Altruism Global*.

## Longtermism: Expanding the Moral Circle Across Time

- Toby Ord (2020). [\*The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity\*](#). London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Hilary Greaves & William MacAskill (2019). [The Case for Strong Longtermism](#). *Global Priorities Institute*.
- Nick Beckstead (2013). [On the Overwhelming Importance of Shaping the Far-Future](#). PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University.
- Nick Bostrom (2003). [Astronomical Waste: The Opportunity Cost of Delayed Technological Development](#). *Utilitas*. 15(3): 308–314.
- William MacAskill (2022). [What We Owe the Future](#). Basic Books.

## Respecting Commonsense Moral Norms

- Allan Gibbard (1984). [Utilitarianism and Human Rights](#). *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 1(2): 92–102.
- R.M. Hare (1981). [Moral Thinking](#). Oxford University Press.
- J.L. Mackie (1985). Rights, Utility, and Universalization. In R.G. Frey (ed.) *Utility and Rights*. Basil Blackwell.
- Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). [Restrictive Consequentialism](#). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 64(4): 438–455.

# Chapter 7: Near-Utilitarian Alternatives

Resources for [Near-Utilitarian Alternatives](#):

## Beyond Welfarism

- Richard Routley (1973). [Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?](#) *Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy*, 1: 205–210.
- Elizabeth Anderson (1999). [What is the Point of Equality?](#) *Ethics* 109 (2): 287–337.
- Derek Parfit (1997). [Equality and Priority](#). *Ratio*, 10 (3): 202–221.

## Prioritarianism

- Derek Parfit (1997). [Equality and Priority](#). *Ratio*, 10(3): 202–221.
- Johan E. Gustafsson (2021). [Ex-Ante Prioritarianism Violates Sequential Ex-Ante Pareto](#). *Utilitas*, 1–11.
- Joshua Greene & Jonathan Baron (2001). [Intuitions about Declining Marginal Utility](#). *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, 14: 243–55.

## Desert-Adjusted Views

- Fred Feldman (1995). [Adjusting utility for justice: A consequentialist reply to the objection from justice](#). *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 55(3): 567–585.

## Egoism and Partialism

- Simon Keller (2013). *Partiality*. Princeton University Press.
- Derek Parfit (1984). Part Two: Rationality and Time, [Reasons and Persons](#). Clarendon Press.
- Andreas Mogensen (2022). [The only ethical argument for positive  \$\delta\$ ?](#) *Philosophical Studies* 179: 2731–2750.
- Troy Jollimore (2018). [Impartiality](#). *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Robert Goodin (1988). [What is so special about our fellow countrymen?](#) *Ethics* 98(4): 663–686.

## Beyond Consequentialism

- John Taurek (1977). [Should the numbers count?](#) *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6(4): 293–316.
- David Ross (1930). *The Right and the Good*. Clarendon Press.
- Elizabeth Ashford (2003) [The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism](#). *Ethics* 113(2): 273–302.

# Chapter 8: Objections to Utilitarianism and Responses

Resources for [Objections to Utilitarianism and Responses](#):

## General

- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). [Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction](#). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 4: Objections.
- J. J. C. Smart & Bernard Williams (1973). [Utilitarianism: For and Against](#). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

## The Rights Objection

- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2017). [Utilitarianism: A Very Short Introduction](#). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 4: Objections, Section “Does utilitarianism tell us to act immorally?”.
- Krister Bykvist (2010). [Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed](#). London: Continuum. Chapter 8: Is Utilitarianism too Permissive?
- Shelly Kagan (1998). [Normative Ethics](#). Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Chapter 3.
- Shelly Kagan (1989). [The Limits of Morality](#). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Eduardo Rivera-López (2012). [The Moral Murderer. A \(more\) effective counterexample to consequentialism](#). *Ratio*, 25(3): 307–325.
- Judith Jarvis Thomson (1976). [Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem](#). *The Monist*. 59 (2): 204–17
- Scott Woodcock (2017). [When Will a Consequentialist Push You in Front of a Trolley?](#) *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*. 95 (2): 299–316.

## The Mere Means Objection

- Samuel Kerstein (2019). [Treating Persons as Means](#), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
- Derek Parfit (2011). *On What Matters: Vol 1*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 9: Merely as a Means.

## The Separateness of Persons Objection

- David Brink (2020). [Consequentialism, the Separateness of Persons, and Aggregation](#). In Douglas W. Portmore (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2021). [Parfit’s Ethics](#), section 3.2. Cambridge University Press.
- Richard Y. Chappell (2015). [Value Receptacles](#). *Noûs*, 49(2): 322–332.

- G.A. Cohen (2011). [Rescuing Conservatism: A Defense of Existing Value](#). In R. Jay Wallace, Rahul Kumar, and Samuel Freeman (eds.), *Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T.M. Scanlon*. Oxford University Press.
- Stephan Dickert, Daniel Västfjäll, Janet Kleber, and Paul Slovic (2015). [Scope insensitivity: The limits of intuitive valuation of human lives in public policy](#). *Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition*, 4(3): 248–255.
- Robert Nozick (1974). *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*. Basic Books.
- Derek Parfit (2003). [Justifiability to Each Person](#). *Ratio*, 16(4): 368–390
- Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul (eds.) (2010). [Utilitarianism: The Aggregation Question](#). Cambridge University Press.
- John Rawls (1971). *A Theory of Justice*. Belknap Press.
- T.M. Scanlon (1998). *What We Owe to Each Other*. Belknap Press.

## The Demandingness Objection

- Brian Berkey (2016). [The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium](#). *Philosophical Studies*. 173(11): 3015–3035.
- Krister Bykvist (2010). [Utilitarianism: A Guide for the Perplexed](#). London: Continuum. Chapter 7: Is Utilitarianism too Demanding?
- Shelly Kagan (1984). [Does Consequentialism Demand Too Much? Recent work on the Limits of Obligation](#). *Philosophy & Public Affairs*. 13(3): 239–254.
- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2014). [The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick and Contemporary Ethics](#). Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 317–336.
- Andreas Mogensen (2020). [Moral demands and the far future](#). *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 103(3): 567–585.
- Peter Singer (1972). [Famine, Affluence, and Morality](#). *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1(3): 229–243.
- David Sobel (2007). [The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection](#). *Philosophers' Imprint*. 7(8): 1–17.
- Susan Wolf (1982). [Moral Saints](#). *The Journal of Philosophy*. 79(8): 419–434.

## The Alienation Objection

- Richard Y. Chappell, (2021). [The Right Wrong-Makers](#). *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 103(2): 426–440.
- Barry Maguire & Calvin Baker (2020). [The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism](#), in D. Portmore (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism*. Oxford University Press.

- Philip Pettit & Geoffrey Brennan (1986). [Restrictive Consequentialism](#). *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 64(4): 438–455.
- Peter Railton (1984). [Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality](#). *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 13(2): 134–171.
- Michael Stocker (1976). [The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories](#). *Journal of Philosophy*, 73: 453–466.
- Bernard Williams (1981). Persons, Character and Morality. In *Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973–1980*, Cambridge University Press.

## The Special Obligations Objection

- Jim A.C. Everett, Nadira S. Faber, Julian Savulescu, and Molly J. Crockett (2018). [The costs of being consequentialist: Social inference from instrumental harm and impartial beneficence](#). *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 79: 200–216.
- Robert Goodin (1988). [What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?](#) *Ethics*, 98(4): 663–686.
- Frank Jackson (1991). [Decision-theoretic consequentialism and the nearest and dearest objection](#). *Ethics*, 101(3): 461–482.
- Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek & Peter Singer (2012). [The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason](#). *Ethics*, 123(1): 9–31.
- Derek Parfit (1984). *Reasons and Persons*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

## The Equality Objection

- Roger Crisp (2003). [Equality, Priority, and Compassion](#). *Ethics*, 113(4): 745–763.
- Toby Ord (2015). [A New Counterexample to Prioritarianism](#). *Utilitas*, 27(3): 298–302.
- Derek Parfit (1997). [Equality and Priority](#). *Ratio*, 10(3): 202–221.
- Larry Temkin (1993). [Inequality](#). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Larry Temkin (2003). [Equality, Priority or What?](#) *Economics and Philosophy*, 19(1): 61–87.

## The Cluelessness Objection

- Joanna Burch-Brown (2014). [Clues for Consequentialists](#). *Utilitas*, 26(1): 105–119.
- Hilary Greaves (2016). [Cluelessness](#). *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 116(3): 311–339.
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## Acting on Utilitarianism

Resources for [Acting on Utilitarianism](#)

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### Effective Altruism

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- William MacAskill (2015). [Doing Good Better: Effective Altruism and How You Can Make a Difference](#). New York: Penguin Random House.
- William MacAskill (2018). [What Are the Most Important Moral Problems of Our Time?](#) *TED*.
- Peter Singer (2013). [The Why and How of Effective Altruism](#). *TED*.

- Websites and organizations relevant to effective altruism:
  - [EffectiveAltruism.org](http://EffectiveAltruism.org): Website providing online resources about effective altruism.
  - [GiveWell](#): Charity evaluator aiming to find outstanding giving opportunities.
  - [80,000 Hours](#): Research non-profit aiming to help talented individuals maximize the social impact of their careers.
  - [Giving What We Can](#): Community of people having pledged to give 10% of their lifetime earnings to effective charities.
  - [Charity Entrepreneurship](#): Charity incubator helping start multiple high-impact charities annually.
- Podcasts on effective altruism & utilitarianism:
  - [Effective Altruism: An Introduction](#). *80,000 Hours Podcast*.
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# Peter Singer's 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality'

Resources for [Study Guide: Peter Singer's 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality'](#)

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